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The Major Determinants of Differential
Mortgage Qualiiy
In order to assess the influence of various combinations of loan, bor-
rower and property characteristics on mortgage quality, we found it
desirable to break down the data in a number of ways. The first division
was made according to loan status—loans being classified as current
(no payment arrearages or arrearages of less than ninety days),
linquent (ninety days or more), arid in foreclosure. Using loan status as
the dependent variable, we then ran regressions for current vs. non-
current (delinquents and loans in foreclosure), delinquent vs. loans in
foreclosure, and, for the USSLL data, current vs. loans in foreclosure.'
Second, we ran separate sets of regressions for each subsample, USSLL,
MBA, and NAMSB. The purpose hete was twofold. Given the large
number of observations and variables, it was more convenient corn-
putationally to work on the subsamples separately. In addition, there
were important differences among the subsamples which would have
been "washed out" had they been combined. A further division of the
'regressions was made according to the number and definition of variables
in each of the subsamples. In the so-called individual versions of the
equations we made maximum use of the information available to us. In
the "pooled" versions, however, we included only variables on which we
had data in each of the subs amples, and these variables were defined in
1Itwas necessary to restrict our comparisons to paired cases, since the re-
gressioii framework will not accommodate a dummy dependent variable which
assumes more than two values. Multiple discriminant analysis offers a possible
alternative, but, given the large number of variables and observations we had to
work with, it proved to be much too cumbersome from a computational stand-
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such a way that we had compatabiity among the equations. This per-
mitted us to focus attention on similarities and differences among the
three subsamples. The end result of all this was a set of thirteen re-
gression equations. Full detail on these equations, along with relevant
statistical tests, is provided in Appendix B.2 The sections which follow,
however, are intended to set forth and evaluate the findings without
going into unnecessary technical detail.
1. Delinquency Risk
Delinquency risk equations were developed by treating the depend-
ent variable, loan status, as a dummy. Thus the variable was assigned
a value of zero if the loan was not currently in difficulty (current) and
a value of one if it was either ninety or more days delinquent or in fore-
closure (noncurrent). While we refer to such functions as risk index
equations, they have often been referred to in econometric studies as
linear probability functions. Ostensibly the function is linear because it
employs the technique of multiple linear regression. It is considered a
probability function because it is estimated by using a dependent variable
which can assume a value of zero or one. Thus the output of the esti-
mated equation, when particular values are assigned to the dependent
variables, should be a number between zero and one. The closer the
value falls to one (noncurrent in our classification scheme), the greater
the probability that the loan will be delinquent. The closer the value
falls to zero, the less the probability of delinquency. Unfortunately,
there is no way of guaranteeing that a particular combination of ob-
served values of the variables will invariably lead to a solution falling be-
tween zero and one. In cases where negative values or values greater than
one arise, it is not possible to assign a probability interpretation to them.
We choose, therefore, to call the regression functions risk equations
and to call the outputs of these equations risk indexes. It is clear that if
the equations have good discriminating power, lower values for the out-
2Thegeneral form of the regression equations is:
=
+ Fl + + +
The subscripted variables are used to show the presence of two or more dummy
classes, and the variable names (mnemonic symbols) are as defined in the text.
In the case of dummy variables it is not necessary to show both a coefficient and a
variable, since whenever the variable falls within a given class it will assume the
value of the coefficient and whenever it falls outside it will assume a value of
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put indicate low risk and high values indicate high risk, whether or not
such values are less than zero or greater than one.
INDIVIDUAL EQUATIONS
As was indicated above, the individual equations for the three sets of
data (USSLL, MBA, and NAMSB) use the maximum number of vari-
ables and data available in each subsample. This means that because
there were differences among the questionnaires and response rates, the
coefficients of the three regression equations cannot be directly com-
pared. It has the advantage, however, of making maximum use of the in-
formation the lender had at his disposal at the time the loan was made.
Since we were primarily interested in discovering the relationship be-
tween loan quality and variables which might enter into the lending de-
cision, we did not explicitly consider such variables as the age of the loan
when the sample was drawn, stated reasons for delinquency, or borrow-
ers' status at the time of delinquency (or drawing of the sample).
Variables which were included in one or more of the regressions are
loan-to-value ratio (RLS), term to maturity (T), monthly payment-to-
income ratio (RPI), borrower occupation (0), number of dependents
(DN), marital status (SM), borrower age (AB), loan purpose (P),
junior financing (FJ), type of lender (TLD), type of loan (TLN),
and region (R). While data were available on age and location of
property, preliminary analysis did not lead us to believe such variables
would be important. The same may be said for property value and
borrower income. Simple cross tabulations relating these variables to
loan status failed to reveal any relationship. It was expected that two of
the variables listed above, loan-to-value ratio and payment-to-income
ratio, would capture the important value and income relationships since
they link them to the pertinent loan characteristics, the former giving a
measure of the borrower's vested interest and the latter his financial
burden. Given the large number of variables we had to work with
some economizing was essential for computation purposes.
The discriminating power of the equations themselves was tested
in three ways—through over-all F ratios, analysis of coefficients of de-
termination (R2's), and Lorenz tests. The F ratios are used to determine
whether the regressions are or are not significant. They are computed
by forming the ratio "regression variance/residual variance." Since the
numerator of the ratio measures how much variance is explained by the
fitted regression function and residual variance measures how much is
left unexplained,it follows that large ratios are indicative of good
discriminating power and that small ratios raise doubts about the esti-46 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
mated relations. Any given ratio may, however, be due solely to chance,
so it becomes necessary to determine how large a ratio pure chance
might lead us to expect. F tables exist for this purpose. Thus by
comparing our results with those found in an F table, we can determine
whether our ratios are likely to be due to chance or whether the
regressions upon which they are based are, iii fact, significant.
The second statistic which was employed, the coefficient of deter-
mination, is useful for two reasons. First, it expresses the ratio of the
sum of the squared deviations "captured" by the regression plane to
the sum of the squared deviations arourId the mean of the dependéñt
variable. Thus it shows the proportion of deviations explained by (or
attributable to) the regression. A second interpretation of the statistic
relates it to the coefficient Of multiple correlation. More specifically, it
can be shown that R2, the coefficient of determination, can be obtained
by squaring the coefficient of multiple correlation, R; These two
interpretations, taken together, underscOre the usefulness of the statistic.
It will readily be seen that its value will range between zero and one
and that the closer it lies to one, the grëatër is the discriminating power
of the regression.
Lorenz tests, which not part of the standard statistical reper-
toire, were developed to show how well the regressions
distinguished between "gOod" and "bad" loans.3 The basic idea was to
use the regression to calculate a risk index for each loan in
the sample and to array the loans according to the size of the index,
beginning with the smallest values and proceeding through the largest.
At each value of the index two ratios calculated, one showing
the percentage of all loans in the having an index value equal
to or less than the one indicated, and another showing the percentage
of "bad" loans thus These ratios were then plotted on graphs,
such as Chart 9, below. It should be immediately apparent. that a
function which has low discriminating power will result in a series of
plots near the reference line, a 45 degree diagonal from the origin.
Conversely, high discrimination would yield plots near the horizontal
and vertical axes. Thus the closet the Lorenz curve lies to the axes (the
more bow it has), the greater the degree of discrimination.
The authors wish to acknowledge the considerable help of Donald Steward
in developing these tests. Mr. Steward, a member of the Social Science Research
Institute computational staff, took some rather vague ideas, expressed them in
more rigorous form, and worked out the computer programs necessary to de-
velop the tests.Major Determinants of Quality 47
The individual versions of the equations for all three subsamples
yielded F ratios which were significant at the 1 per cent level, thereby
indicating that at least some discrimination was achieved.4 The ratio
was highest for the USSLL equation and lowest for the MBA. Similar
patterns emerged for the coefficients of determination and the Lorenz
tests. The USSLL equation produced the highest coefficient of determina-
tion (about 11.5 per cent), followed by the NAMSB version (just under
5 per cent) and the MBA (under 4 per cent). These values are quite
low by any standards, but they are not totally meaningless. If it were
possible to predict quality absolutely on the basis of the few variables
and simple functional forms we have included, mortgage underwriters
would long ago have developed rating schemes to reflect this fact. The
truth is many variables interact, and in ways not yet imagined. That
does not mean that studies of this type are fruitless, for in spite of
what remains unexplained, valuable insights emerge. A second point
to bear in mind is that cross-section microeconomic data such as we
used typically yield much lower R2's, than the time series data to which
so many of us have become accustomed. This is true largely because
these observations can be explained by circumstances that are idiosyn-
cratic to individual households and have no particular relevance or
interest from the point of view of economic analysis. Finally, the use
of a dummy dependent variable and the large number of observations
almost certainly reduced the R2's below what they otherwise would
have been. Consider the influence of dummies. If the sample on which
the regression is being run is roughly 50 per cent current and 50 per
cent noncurrent (as ours were), the expected value of the dependent
variable over the whole sample must be one-half (.5). Theoretically,
its value for any particular set of observations on the independent
variables will fall somewhere between zero and one, with a probability
of zero of its being either zero or one exactly. Yet when this calculated
value is compared to the observed value (which must be either zero
or one by definition) any deviation will lower the value of the R2,
sometimes by a substantial amount. In spite of these anomalies, the
relative sizes of the coefficients are probably indicative of the differences
The statement "significant at the 1 per cent level" means simply that when
we assert some statement is true (for example, that the equations dodiscriminate
between good and bad loans), we can expect to be wrong no more than one out
of a hundred times. Similarly, if we were to say "significant at the 5percent
level," we could expect to be wrong one out of every twenty times. We follow
standard usage of these terms in subsequent sections by referring to 1 per cent
significance as "highly significant" and 5percent significance as "significant."
Those interested in seeing the statistics upon which our statements are based can
find them in Appendix B.Percentage of
noncurrent loans
100
SOURCE: Appendix Tables B 1 4—B 16.
in the discriminating power among the equations, and for this reason,
together with its familiarity, we will continue to use the statistic.
The Lorenz curves in Chart 9 confirm the findings of the R2 tests
as to the relative discriminating power of the three equations.5 It is obvi-
The curves referred to do not, strictly speaking, fall under the usual defini-
tion of a Lorenz curve. The manner in which an ordinary Lorenz curve is con-
structed insures that it will increase at a constant or increasing rate throughout its
length. The method we used for plotting values provided no such assurance.
Nevertheless a freehand fitting of curves to the plotted values yielded, perhaps
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ous from this chart, however, that the equations do a better job of dis-
criminating between good and bad loans than the low value of the R2's
might suggest. Indeed, the rather pronounced bow in the USSLL curve
indicates that that equation does a fairly decent job of quality rating.
This is not to suggest that the equation could not be improved upon or
that misassignments occur only occasionally, but at least it indicates a
step in the right direction.
With regard to the independent variables used in the regressions,
a number of noteworthy points emerged.6 We discuss these in the
variables' order of appearance in the equations. Loan-to-value ratio
bore a strong positive relation to delinquency risk in all three equations.
In fact, it turned out to be the most important variable in both the
MBA and NAMSB equations. In the USSLL equation it trailed only
loan purpose and junior financing in order of importance.7 Neither of
the latter two variables appeared in the MBA and NAMSB versions.
It should also be noted that the coefficient for this variable was significant
at the 1 per cent level in all three equations.
The behavior of the term to maturity variable was most surprising.
It differed significantly from zero only in the NAMSB equation, but it
carried a negative sign in all three versions. This would seem to indicate
that longer maturities are associated with a lower rather than a higher
risk of delinquency. In view of the fact that most lenders (and we
ourselves) regard a liberalization of terms, ceteris paribus, as adding
to risk, how can such a phenomenon be explained? First of all, the
reader must bear in mind that we are speaking only of risksof
delinquency—not foreclosure or potential loss on the loan. Secondly,
the negative sign might well be no more than a statistical aberration
which stems from the form of the equations we employed. Of the three
equations we estimated, the NAMSB version (the one in which the
negative sign was significant) contained the fewest number of variables.
It is worth noting in this connection that the coefficient was smallest
accidentally, curves with Lorenz characteristics. A more important reason for
adopting the terminology, however, is that the curves we have constructed and
Lorenz curves are designed for the same purpose—to graphically portray in-
equality in one distribution with reference to another.
6Simplecorrelations between the independent variables suggest that multi-
collinearity was not a serious problem. In all cases but one (loan-to-value ratio
vs. term to maturity) the correlations were well below .2. Even in the exceptional
case, the coefficient typically was below .5.
7 Importancewas measured in two ways, through partial correlation co-
efficients and beta coefficients. The former are self-explanatory; the latter are
used to determine how many standard deviations of change occur in the de-
pendent variable for each standard deviation change in the independent.50 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
in the USSLL version and this is the only one in which we were able
to include loan purpose and junior financing. It would appear then,
that the dropping of variables, particularly loan purpose and junior
financing, biases the coefficient in the negative direction. Why might
this be? If, as is likely to be the case, loans for refinancing or repair
or which have junior financing associated with them have shorter
maturities, the latter variable could be acting as a proxy for the other
two. That such a possibility is indeed likely will be seen when the
pooled versions of the equations are examined. When loan purpose and
junior financing were dropped from the USSLL equation, the negative
coefficient grew in size and its "t"valuebecame significant at the 1
per cent level. Furthermore, examination of scaled down (intermediate)
versions of all three equations reveals that as more variables are dropped,
the negative value of the coefficient increases, as does its "t"value.
Even in the most complete version of the equation (USSLL) we
may not have been able to include all the relevant variables. For
example, we were unable to include either wealth ot liquid assets, both
measures of financial strength and borrowers' ability to pay. It stands
to reason that loans with shorter maturities will carry higher monthly
payments. If, therefore, no explicit account is taken of financial strength
and if shorter maturities are associated with weaker borrowers, results
similar to ours could be expected. Shorter maturities might well be
associated with weaker borrowers if lenders, in perceiving the greater
(but still acceptable)risks, require a more rapid repayment of the
loan to ensure a quicker buildup of equity.
In sum, it would appear that the negative signs we observed are
not likely to be indicative of the "true" relationship between risk and
term to maturity. Rather, it would appear that the most likely association
is one of no net influence when the equation is properly specified. Even
this conclusion must be interpreted with caution, however, for it applies
only to what one is likely to observe in practice. If lenders were to
throw all caution to the winds and require little or no buildup of equity
on a property which is declining in value, defaults would almost certainly
ensue.
The behavior of the monthly payment-to-income variable was
hardly less surprising than that of term to maturity. It too carried a
negative sign, even though it failed the significance test at the 1 per cent
level. In one case, however (the MBA version), it turned out to be
significant at the 5 per cent level. We had anticipated that this ratio
would serve as a good measure of financial burden and would thus varyMajor Determinants of Quality 51
directly with delinquency That it c!id not might be evidence that
lenders have been successful in controlling this aspect of risk. Since
our sample included only those loans which passed the lenders' (and
in the case of FHA and VA, the underwriters') screening process, loans
with dangerously high ratios may have already been filtered out. If that
is the case, we may have observed only random variability in the ratio
rather than variability which would be indicative of risk. This possibility
seems to be borne out by some cross tabulations which we ran on the
data. In the USSLL and MBA subsamples, for example, more than 96
per cent of the loans had payment-to-income ratios under 25 per cent.8
In the NAMSB sample, 92 per cent of the loans were so classified.
These figures would indicate that, for the most part, lenders imposed a
fairly strict upper limit of about 25 per cent on the ratio. It could be
that such a limit is well within the "safe" range and the observed
delinquencies must, therefore, be attributed to other causes.
Occupation provided a good example of the need for common
definitions among the samples. There is little doubt that the variable is
important, but differences in occupational groupings made comparison
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, a few clear-cut patterns did emerge.
Salesmen showed high risk coefficients inall three equations, even
though in one case (MBA) the difference between this coefficient and
that of the reference group (skilled laborers) was not significant. Self-
employed persons were also high risk in the one sample in which they
appeared (USSLL). At the other end of the spectrum, professionals
(not significant in NAMSB) and managers, executives, and proprietors
(not significant in NAMSB) yielded the lowest risk coefficients.9 The
remaining occupational groups, inchicling skilled and unskilled labor,
service workers, clerical or civil service employees, and craftsmen or
foremen were pretty well clustered together between the low and the
high risk extremes. The one exception to this was in the USSLL sample,
where white-collar workers were at the low risk end of the spectrum.
Number of dependents bore a direct relationship to risk in the
USSLL version, with risk coefficients increasing steadily from the second
8Itis perhaps worth noting that variability below the 25percent level was
much greater for the USSLL than for the other two groups. For example, only 7
per cent of the MBA loans had ratios under 10 per cent, while 33 per cent of the
USSLL loans were under this figure.
The practice which both the MBA and NAMSB adopted of lumping
proprietors in with managers almost certainly gave a coefficient closer to zero
than would have otherwise been the case. It is clear from examining the USSLL
data that self-employed persons (which includes proprietors) are high risk, while
executives or managers are low.52 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
through the eighth dependent. In the MBA and NAMSB samples, how-
ever, the variable did not turn out to be significant. Some tendency
toward a direct relationship was evident, but it was far from clear-cut.
In view of the fact that the USSLL equation showed the greatest
discriminating power, we are inclined to accept the evidence that a
direct relationship between number of dependents and risk does exist.
There is also a fairly strong a priori basis for this conclusion, since
larger families mean higher expenses in expenditure areas where we
lacked data.
Marital status did not appear to be a significant factor in any of
the equations, though the risk coefficients were uniformly lower for
married than for single borrowers. In the USSLL sample, where a
finer breakdown was provided, the ranking in terms of the size of the
coefficients was widowed, divorced, single, and married, in that order.
Borrower age was a significant factor in both the USSLL and MBA
equations, but the pattern was so mixed that any conclusion must be
highly tentative. Granting the exceptions,itappeared that younger
borrowers (those under 40) might offer greater risks than those 40 and
above. We hasten to add, however, that the evidence isfar from
conclusive on this point.
Loan purpose, which was included in only the USSLL sample,
proved to be an extremely important determinant of risk. As one might
expect, loans extended for house purchase showed the best performance,
and by a considerable margin. Construction loans came next in order
of risk, followed by loans for repair and, finally, refinancing. The degree
of risk associated with refinancing is underscored by the fact that it
carried a larger coefficient (and higher "t"value)than any other dummy
variable in the equation. Junior financing, which also was excluded
from the MBA and NAMSB samples, was virtually on a par with loan
purpose in order of importance. Loans for which some form of secondary
financing was present carried much higher risk coefficients than those
without.
Region was included in the equations only to isolate the effects of
geographical influence and, as one might expect, risk bore a direct
relationship to regional delinquency patterns. The fact that there were
significant differences among the regions indicates that failure to include
the variable would have seriously biased the results.This applies
particularly to the USSLL equation, where the greatest differences
emerged.
None of the coefficients for lender type was significant, evenMajor Determinants of Quality 53
though some weak patterns were in evidence.'0 Perhaps not surprisingly,
loans from commercial banks and trusteed funds appeared to be some-
what less risky than loans held by mortgage bankers for their own
account or for individuals. The differences were not sharp, but they
may indicate that some loans in the mortgage bankers' portfolios are
there because they were not salable to other institutions. Another possi-
bility is that they reflect loans transferred back to the mortgage banker
for foreclosure.
Loan type (FHA, VA, or conventional) entered into both the
NAMSB and MBA equations, but since the USSLL sample included
only conventional loans, the variable does not appear in that version.
Surprisingly, FHA and VA loans showed significantly lower risk co-
efficients than conventionals, These differences were significant at the
1 per cent level for the MBA sample and at the 5 per cent level for the
NAMSB. Itis possible that this finding reflects only differences in
underwriting and appraisal practices—factors which we could not
measure. It most certainly indicate that conventionals are more
risky, per Se. Indeed, when the combined influence of this variable and
the others is considered, it is likely that FHA's and VA's are more, not
less, risky than conventionals. We have already noted, for example, that
high loan-to-value ratios are associated with high delinquency risk.
Since FHA and VA loans are likely to involve lower downpayments
than conventional loans, this factor could dominate.
POOLED EQUATIONS
The pooled versions, as was noted above, were arrived at by dropping
variables for which data were not available in all three subsamples and
by redefining others so as to make them compatible. We had initially
intended actually to pool all of the observations and compute one
equation which we could compare with similar equations for each of
the subsamples. This would have enabled us to determine whether
differences among the subsamples were statistically significant. We can
make judgments about these differences; however, by merely comparing
equations for each subsample. In view of the additional programming
and computer time involved in developing the statistical tests associated
with the initial plan, it was decided to abandon it in favor of the less
sophisticated "judgment" approach.
The over-all discriminating power of the pooled equations was, as
10Lendertype applied.only to the MBA equation since loans in the USSLL
and NAMSB samples were, by definition, held by savings and loan associations
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we anticipated, somewhat less than for the individual versions. All the
equations, however, continued to be significant at the 1 per cent level,
as measured by their F ratios.h1 R2's (coefficients of determination)
were somewhat lOwer for all equations, but especially for the USSLL
version, where a drop from 11.5 to 8 per cent was recorded. Even
so, the relative rankings were maintained, with the USSLL showing
the best discriminating power, followed by NAMSB and MBA, in that
order. Similar patterns were observed in the Lorenz tests (Chart 10),
although the apparent loss in discriminating power there was not as
great as shown the R2's. For example, while the R2 value in the USSLL
equation declined by nearly one-third, it does not appear that the area
between the reference line and the USSLL Lorenz curve diminished by
more than about 20 per cent. Shifts in the MBA and NAMSB curves
negligible.
Loan-to-value ratio continued to show a strong positive relationship
to risk, yielding highly significant positive coefficients in all three equa-
tions. Negative signs were again indicated for the term-to-maturity
coefficients and these were significant at the 1 per cent level in both the
USSLL and MBA versions, and at the 5 per cent level in the NAMSB.
This tends to confirm the point made earlier, that this variable is prob-
ably serving as a proxy for some which we omitted. It will be recalled
that in the individual versions only one coefficient (NAMSB) was sig-
nificant. Dropping variables, as we did in the pooled versions, however,
has the effect of generating larger coefficients, pushing "t" values over
the critical level. Payment-to-income ratio once again failed to satisfy
the significance tests at either the 1 per cent or 5 per cent level.
Among the occupational groupings salesmen had high risk co-
efficients in all three cases, although the MBA coefficient did not quite
satisfy the criterion for significance. Proprietors and self-employed were
among the high risks in the USSLL and NAMSB samples, but not in
the MBA—possibly, as was indicated earlier, because managers were
included in this group. Unskilled laborers were fairly high risk in all
three cases, even though the coefficients were just at the margin of
significance for the MBA and NAMSB. Service and miscellaneous
workers and skilled labor were near the center of the risk spectrum,
followed by clerical workers. It should be noted, however, that in the
NAMSB sample, the risk coefficient was greater for clerical workers
11 Actually, the F ratios for the pooled versions of the MBA and NAMSB
equations were slightly higher than they were for the individual versions. This
can be attributed to the fact that some variables which were not significant in the
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than for either skilled labor or miscellaneous. Professional and technical
personnel had the lowest risk coefficient in every case, except for the
USSLL, where white-collar workers (classified clerical) had the best
performance. Considering the definitional problems raised by differences
in the questionnaires, it was encouraging from an analytical standpoint
to be able to establish the importance of occupation. One can only
conclude that the nature of a borrower's employment has an important




0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Percentageof loans Ln sample56 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
an inverse relation between job skill and risk. The self-employed or
proprietor category provides a notable, but not surprising, exception
to this pattern. The fact that the risk coefficient is high for this group
may be indicative of the inseparability of one's personal and business
affairs. Typically, when a proprietor is facing financial problems in his
business, he must resort to using his personal resources to attempt to
remedy the situation.
Number of dependents proved to be significant (at the 1 per cent
level) in only one equation (USSLL). Nevertheless, the same general
pattern was observed here as in the individual equations. The degree
of risk increased steadily with increasing numbers of dependents, except
at the extremes (zero or seven or more dependents), where the results
were mixed. Marital status was significant in the USSLL version, but
once again failed the test in the other two. That the one coefficient which
was significant showed married people to be better risks tends to confirm
the earlier findings concerning this variable.
Borrower age, as in the individual versions, presented a very
irregular pattern. By the greatest stretch of one's imagination, a general
downward trend in risk with increasing age can be detected. Exceptions,
however, occur in every sample. For the USSLL the pattern is broken
by the coefficients for the 30—34agebracket (too low) and the 50—59
bracket (too high). For the MBA the 3 0—34 coefficient is too high,
the 35—39 too low, and the 50—59 too low. For the NAMSB the
30—34 bracket is too low and the 40—44 bracket is much too high.
Considering all the exceptions, the safest course would probably be to
conclude that age has no apparent systematic effect on risk.
Regional coefficients, as well as loan type and lender type, generally
followed the patterns observed in the individual versions. One exception
to this was under loan type in the MBA sample. In the earlier version,
FHA 203 loans and other FHA's were treated separately. Lumping
them together for the pooled version apparently reduced the value of
the coefficient to the point where it was no longer significant.
2. ForeclOsure Risk
Up to now our analysis has been concerned with only one aspect
of quality—delinquency risk. We now turn our attention to a second,
namely, foreclosure risk. Foreclosure risk was measured in two ways
for this study:first,as a conditional probability showing risk of
foreclosure, given that a loan was already in default; second, as an
unconditional probability showing the risk that a current loan will endMajor Determinants of Quality 57
up in foreclosure. The first measure was calculated in the same way as
delinquency risk, only in this case we worked exclusively with the
noncurrent part of the sample, comparing loans in foreclosure with
loans which were delinquent but not in foreclosure. This was done for
all three subsamples and for both individual and pooled versions. The
second measure was developed by comparing current loans with loans
in foreclosure. Because the USSLL sample seemed to provide the best
data, this second measure of foreclosure risk was developed only for
that group and only in the form which made maximum use of the data.
available (individual).
INDIVIDUAL EQUATIONS
The discriminating power of the foreclosure risk equations proved to
be somewhat better than for the delinquency risk set. As before, F
ratios were all significant at the 1 per cent level, but thcre was noticeable
improvement in both the coefficients of determination and in the Lorenz
curves. "Explained" variation (R2) rose to about 13 per cent for the
USSLL equation, to nearly 7 per cent for the MBA, and to just over 10
per cent for the NAMSB. The more dramatic improvement, however,
was in the Lorenz curves. In the USSLL version, for example, the
lowest quartile of loans as ranked by the risk index contained only
about 1 per cent of the loans in foreclosure, and the lowest half only
about 2 per cent (Chart 11). In fact, the index had to rise to the point
where 90 per cent of all loans were included before the proportion of
foreclosures reached the 50 per cent mark. This kind of performance
certainly could not have been inferred from the R2 which we calculated
for this equation, and is perhaps indicative of the pitfalls associated
with that statistic. Our regression equations do not fit perfectly into
the classical least-squares framework because of our use of dummy vari-
ables. Nevertheless, approaches such as ours have been standard in the
literature for several years. We merely point Out that the Lorenz tests
indicate that when the usual assumptions do not hold, rather important
discrepancies may arise.
While the same independent variables were used in the foreclosure
risk equations as in the delinquency risk set, we had no reason to
believe that they would behave in the same way. There is no a priori
basis for regarding loans in foreclosure merely as delinquents viewed at
a later point in time. In fact, most loans which become seriously
delinquent subsequently are restored to current status. It seems likely,
therefore, that there are important differences between delinquents,
per Se, and loans which ultimately result in foreclosure. This point is58 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
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One of these (USSLL) was significant at the 5 per cent level. In the
NAMSB and MBA cases, t values were just short of the critical levels.
The fact that both of these variables yielded positive signs emphasizes
the inherent risks in low-equity loans. Small initial equities coupled
with slower buildups (through stretched-out maturities)almost cer-
tainly pose substantial foreclosure hazards once a default has taken
place.
The coefficients for payment-to-income ratio did not differ signifi-
cantly from zero, except in the USSLL version, where it carried a
positivesign.It would seem, however, that the fact thatallthe
coefficients were algebraically larger than they were in the delinquency
risk equations is not without significance. A priori, one would expect
this kind of pattern if the variable serves at all to measure financial
burden. Once a loan has slipped into the seriously delinquent category
(by being three or more payments in arrears), it should be more difficult
for the borrower to continue to make regular payments and make up
the ones he has missed than to merely keep his payments current. If
this is the case, one would expect larger risk coefficients for the fore-
closure than for the delinquency equations.
Among the occupational groups there was less differentiation than
in the delinquency risk equations, and the patterns that did emerge
were quite at variance with the earlier results. For example, salesmen,
who had been uniformly high risk in the delinquency case, yielded low
risk coefficients for foreclosure in both the MBA and NAMSB equations
(both were significant). Conversely, executives and managers, who had
been among the better risks in the delinquency equations, provided the
only significant coefficient in the USSLL foreclosure equation, but at
the high-risk end of the spectrum. The other groups were pretty well
clustered near the center, with the relative sizes of the coefficients vary-
ing from equation to equation. In contrast to the earlier results, therefore,
it would be difficult to argue that there is any discernible relationship
between occupational skill level and foreclosure risk.
Number of dependents and borrower age appeared to have little
systematic effect on foreclosure risk, although some of the coefficients
were significant at the1 per cent level. The pattern appeared to be
more or less random, however, with one possible exception. Very large
families (eight or more dependents) yielded high risk coefficients in
all three samples, and two of these were significantly greater than zero.
This suggests that, within the usual family size limits, little distinction
arises between delinquent loans and those in foreclosure; but that once
the family becomes unusually large, foreclosure risks increase sub-
stantially. Marital status did not contribute significantly to the fore-60 Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure
closure risk. Both USSLL and NAMSB versions yielded lower coeffi-
cients for married than for unmarried borrowers, but none of these
estimates were statistically signfficant.
Loan purpose (available only in the USSLL sample) again proved
to be highly significant, as did junior financing. Loans for refinancing,
as before, yielded a large riskcoefficient, but the highest riskis
associated with construction loans. This tends to confirm a belief long
held by lenders that builder loans pose substantially higher than average
foreclosure risks. Given the earlier finding that construction loans carry
relatively high delinquency risks, the size of the foreclosure risk co-
efficient indicates that lenders' fears are well founded. What may be
surprising, however, is the degree of risk associated with refinancing.
This coefficient too was high for both the delinquency and foreclosure
categories, suggesting that these loans are perhaps more hazardous than
has heretofore been thought. Junior financing likewise appears to fore-
bode ill, since the risk coefficient in the foreclosure equation is, as it
was in the earlier version, quite high.
Regional coefficients, as was true in the delinquency equations,
were highly significant, but are of little interest in themselves. Lender
type, which applied only to the MBA equation, yielded a number of
highly significant coefficients. Basically, they show that other things
being equal,i.e.the other variables in the equation, the mortgage
banker's chances of foreclosure are much less on loans serviced for
commercial banks and individuals or on those held in his own account
than they are for loans held for other financial intermediaries. Whether
this finding reflects differences in foreclosure policies, types of loans
for which the banker does servicing, or some other factor, we cannot
say. It certainly doesn't imply that the over-all risk of foreclosure is
higher for lenders other than commercial banks and individuals who
leave the servicing to the mortgage banker. The higher risk interpretation
once again applies only to the variables whose influence we specifically
excluded. Loan type also proved to be a significant factor in the MBA
equation, though not in the NAMSB. As was the case with delinquency
risk, conventional loans carried the highest risk, followed by FHA's
other than 203's, VA's, and FHA 203's. Differences between the latter
three categories were not significant, but they all yielded significantly
lower coefficients than conventionals.
POOLED EQUATIONS
As was true for the delinquency risk equations, pooling caused some
loss in discriminating power. Nevertheless, F ratios for all the equationsMajor Determinants of Quality 61
were well above rejection limits for significance at the 1 per cent level.
Coefficients of determination were off somewhat, falling to 11 per cent
for the USSLL, 5.5 per cent for the MBA, and 8.2 per cent for the
NAMSB equation, but the percentage decline was not as great as in
the delinquency equations. There was also a perceptible reduction in
the area between the Lorenz curves and the reference line, although
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Loan-to-value ratio and term to maturity continued to show a pos-
itive correlation with risk, but with some loss in significance. The loan-
to-value ratio, which had been highly significant in the MBA and
NAMSB individual versions, met the 5 per cent criterion in only NAMSB
after pooling. The term-to-maturity variable was significant (at the 1 per
cent level) only in the USSLL version. While these results do not lend
great support to the findings for the individual versions, they certainly
do not contradict them.
The payment-to-income ratio coefficient was positive in two of the
three equations (USSLL and MBA), but only one of these (USSLL)
was significant. The NAMSB coefficient, as in the individual version,
was negative but not significant. Again the evidence would seem to
suppQrt the contention that this variable probably does a better job of
measuring financial burden for foreclosure risk than for delinquency.
With but two exceptions, the remaining variables closely followed
the patterns already commented upon for the individual versions of the
equations. The exceptions, both in the MBA equation, occurred in the
marital status and loan-type coefficients. Marital status, in the earlier
version, yielded a lower value for single than for married borrowers,
but the difference was not significant. This time the order was reversed,
even though the coefficient just fell short of the critical level for
significance. The result still leaves marital status in the doubtful category
as far as significance is concerned, but would indicate that if a relation-
ship does exist, married borrowers are probably less risky than single.
As was the case with the delinquency equations, combining FHA 203's
and other FHA's appeared to destroy the value of the loan-type variable.
None of the coefficients was significant in the pooled version (where
they had been in the individual), and the coefficient for conventional
loans ranked between FHA's and VA's. These results are parallel to
those for the NAMSB (where no breakdown of FHA's was employed).
STRAIGHT FORECLOSURE RISK: CURRENT LOANS
VERSUS LOANS IN FORECLOSURE
As was pointed out at the beginning of the foreclosure risk discussion,
the previous two sections can be viewed as providing useful measures
of the conditional probability of foreclosure, given that a loan is already
in default. The present section, however, focuses upon the unconditional
probability of foreclosure, and does so by matching the characteristics
of current loans against the characteristics of loans in foreclosure. Since
the USSLL data provided uniformly better results in the equations
discussed above, it was decided to rely exclusively on that sample forMajor Determinants of Quality 63
developing the tests in this section. The decision was based in part on
consideration of computation expense and in part on a desire to keep
the arguments as straightforward as possible. Our previous results lead
us to believe that our conclusions would not be substantially altered by
the introduction of additional equations.
The discriminating power of estimated relationship was, on the
whole, quite good. The F ratio was clearly significant at the 1 per cent
level, even though it was numerically smaller than some of the others.
The coefficient of determination was also lower, accounting for only
about 5 per cent of the The Lorenz curve, however, indicates
that both of these statistics have a downward bias. The curvature (Chart
13) is only slightly less than it was in the USSLL individual version
of the conditional delinquency risk equation, and substantially greater
than any of the others. It should be noted, for example, that the lowest
quartile of loans, as ranked by risk index value, contained less than 1
per cent of the loans in foreclosure. The lowest half only contained
about 11 per cent of the foreclosures, and the lowest three-quarters
only about 23 per cent. It would be erroneous, therefore, to place much
weight on the low value of the R2 statistic.
While there were no particular surprisesin the signsof the
coefficients, some of the variables which we had expected to be
significant did not turn out that way. Loan-to-value ratio,
income ratio, occupation, marital status, and number of dependents
all failed the tests, and borrower age yielded only one significant co-
efficient. It is worth noting that loan-to-value ratio and payment-to-
income ratio both yielded positive coefficients, but only the former
was anywhere near the required level for significance. Term to maturity,
however, yielded a rather large positive coefficient and was significant
at the 1 per cent level.
Once again loan purpose and junior financing were the key
iiidicators of risk, the latter provided by far the highest coefficient and
correlation with the dependent variable. Construction loans continued
to lead loans for all other purposes in terms of contribution to risk,
but refinancing and repair were not far behind. Home purchase remained
at the low-risk end of the spectrum, and by a significant amount.
Regional coefficients also yielded highly significant differences, again
emphasizing the need to isolate such influences whenever possible. It is
almost certain that some of the other relationships we estimated would
have come out differently had this variable not been allowed for.
In general, these results follow the pattern one would expect from
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vs. foreclosure equations. That is, the coefficients in the present equation
tended to fall between the coefficients for the earlier versions. Thus,
if the signs on the previous equations differed, the sign for the current
vs. foreclosure equation could be either plus or minus, depending on
which of the two risks, delinquency or conditional foreclosure, domi-
nated. Where the signs were the same on the earlier versions, the
present equation yielded a coefficient whose sign confirmed that, but
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of the earlier relationships. Thus, for example, while loan-to-value
ratio was significant in the delinquent vs. in foreclosure equation, it was
not in the current vs. noncurrent, and this latter relationship dominated
in the current vs. in foreclosure. The usefulness of the latter equation is
underscored both by its evident discriminating power and by its ability
to draw out such relationships.